Tigrayan exceptionalism has
led to the war, and is now hindering peace
10 April,
2022
by Zola
Moges
Posted on
Ethiopia Insight
Photo
credit Ethiopian Semay
Tigray’s political elites’
claims of exceptionalism based on the region’s glorious history and strong
military posture is problematic.
Ethiopia has been bleeding
from a self-destructive civil war for eighteen months now. Tens of thousands or
more have died, millions have been displaced, the country’s international
standing is severely weakened, national security is threatened, the economy is
in shambles, and social cohesion is at an all-time low.
While the war has had
devastating consequences in Afar and Amhara since July 2021, Tigray has shouldered
most of its brutal effects for a protracted period.
Millions of Tigrayans have
close to no supply of electricity, water, medicine, and banking services, and
the region is almost entirely disconnected from the world. It is a miracle—and
a testament to the tenacity of ordinary Tigrayans—that they are getting by
under such horrible conditions.
The causes of this crisis
include several historical, ideological, socio-political, and economic factors.
However, in my view, the
war in Tigray has been caused and perpetuated to a large extent by one
self-serving belief among Tigrayan political elites. I call this belief
“Tigrayan exceptionalism,” something akin to what is commonly known as
“American exceptionalism.”
Tigrayan exceptionalism is
essentially marked by contradictory myths, narratives, and interests, which all
boil down to a demand for differential treatment and special entitlement. This
attitude from the elite contributed to the current crisis and is now among the
obstacles to peace.
Glory and rebellion
Sentiments of Tigrayan
exceptionalism appear to have stemmed from the historical narrative that
portrays Tigray as a source of ancient civilization, the gatekeeper of
Ethiopia, and the biggest contributor to the country’s nation-building project.
After all, Tigray is the
home of the ancient Axumite civilization, the cornerstone of the Ethiopian
Orthodox Church and its traditions, the birthplace of great Ethiopian warriors
and emperors, and the vessel through which Islam first came into Ethiopia.
Whether the Axumite
civilization and other glorious historical records in Tigray were exclusively
‘Tigrayan’ or rather the collective achievements of various groups, including
Agews, Tigrayans, Amharas, and Arabs, is something to be left for historians.
Nonetheless, the common
view among Tigrayan elites is that Tigray made the foremost contribution to
Ethiopia’s early state-building process, Tigray is the core state of
Ethiopia—its birthplace, so to speak—and others are peripheries which became
part of Ethiopia in time.
Some even claim that Tigray
is the home of a once advanced polity that has failed to maintain its great
civilization as a result of its unsuccessful mission of civilizing a backward
Ethiopia. This exceptionalist attitude by Tigrayan elites has led them to
embrace, perhaps unconsciously, the position that Tigray needs to always be at
the center of Ethiopia’s state power—anything less is deemed unacceptable.
Indeed, in modern Ethiopian
history, there is no time when Tigrayan elites have not rebelled against
whoever is at the Ethiopian center—except when Tigrayans are the center, of
course.
The two Woyane rebellions
are cases in point. The first, in 1943, was a strong yet unsuccessful uprising
in Tigray against Emperor Haile Selassie’s regime, which was viewed as a
‘Shewan’ center by Tigray elites. The second was the successful armed struggle
waged against the Derg by the TPLF in the mid-1970s that culminated with
Tigrayan elites capturing state power in 1991.
The view among Tigrayan
elites is that these rebellions were justified resistance against injustice and
oppression.
Sadly, however, Tigrayan
elites have often subjected others to the same injustice and mistreatment that
they claimed to have fought against. Accordingly, many see Tigrayan
insurrection as a fight for dominance and exceptionalism based on the elite’s
belief that they are always entitled to rule or significantly control rulers,
but never to be ruled.
EPRDF Era
Alongside the desire to
overthrow an oppressive regime, Tigrayan exceptionalism, as the bedrock of
Tigray nationalism, was among the driving forces behind TPLF’s seventeen-year
armed struggle against the Derg regime.
Initially, TPLF’s stated
aim, as presented in its 1976 manifesto, was Tigray’s secession. The principal
goal of this project was said to be returning Tigray to its “glorious
past.”When TPLF and its allied forces defeated the Derg, it was portrayed as a
Tigrayan feat, the defeat of a giant Goliath by the small David. This gave TPLF
both a self-assured certainty and clout of legitimacy that stemmed from the
barrel of a gun. Thereafter, TPLF advanced a narrative of its own
exceptionalism—that it is invincible and entitled to dominate the country.
Consequently, the
allocation of key military and political positions to members of the new
Tigrayan ruling class was justified as ‘deserved’. Elites from other ethnic
groups were allowed to hold political or economic power only as long as they
had TPLF’s blessing.
Within the EPRDF ruling
party, TPLF further arrogated to itself an equal number of representatives in
the Executive and Central Committees as its coalition partners from Oromo,
Amhara, and Southern regions, despite Tigray not having even one-third of the
populations of the other regions.
Loyalist political elites
were also put in place within each region. This was done because, if fully
implemented, the new constitutional design would make Tigrayans a permanent
minority. However, Tigray’s elites manipulated the governance structure to
avoid such a situation, on the apparent assumption that they would always stay
at the helm of power.
As a way to overcome their
constant fear and insecurity as a minority ruling class, Tigrayan elites also
oppressed other groups by various means. This created a sense of resentment and
alienation among other ethnic groups, making TPLF a much-loathed group in the
country.
The ultimate result was
that Tigrayan political elites created multiple sworn enemies, both within and
outside the EPRDF coalition.
TPLF retreated
At no time in the past has
Tigrayan exceptionalism been as visible as in the last four years.
When Prime Minister Abiy
Ahmed came to power in April 2018, TPLF initially appeared to have welcomed the
inevitable change. Unfortunately, this lasted briefly, and TPLF went back to
Mekelle and resumed advancing rhetoric of its own and Tigray’s exceptionalism.
In both mainstream and social media, Tigrayan political elites began to paint war not as an internecine project with consequences of human suffering and destruction but as “Tigray’s cultural sport”, as if the art of war is an exclusively innate gift of Tigrayans.
The elites also proclaimed that Tigray is a de facto independent nation and TPLF’s mass mobilization of resources was justified as a necessary measure to fight against Abiy’s hidden plan to subdue Tigray. Such rhetoric insinuates that only Tigray has not been subdued—while the rest of Ethiopia is—and that its forces alone can stand in Abiy’s way.
Tigray’s elites described
the simmering disagreement with the federal government as a clash of visions
between forces of centralization and decentralization. In this narrative,
Tigrayan elites portrayed themselves as the guardians of federalism and,
domineeringly, the spokespeople of “nations and nationalities.”
The open rejection of their
authoritarianism and domination by Somalis, Sidamas, Gurages, and Afaris—groups
who satisfy TPLF’s definition of “nations and nationalities”—were all
considered the work of Abiy and his Amhara supporters, not the true voice of
the said people, who, according to Tigrayan elites, still need help to know
what’s in their best interest.
Most hypocritical was
TPLF’s accusation that Abiy’s administration is ‘unitarist’ and adamant to centralise
power, as if its own 27 years in charge were not marked by centralization in
the name of ‘revolutionary democracy’ and ‘democratic centralism.
As divisions with the federal government grew, TPLF frequently made two demands: negotiated political solutions and respect for the constitution. But, what its leaders eventually did was the exact opposite.
Overtures for peace and
negotiation were rejected by the TPLF, claiming that it didn’t want to talk
with the central government alone and instead preferred an all-inclusive
dialogue.
It then rejected the House
of Federation’s ruling to postpone the general elections, alleging the decision
was unconstitutional, despite the House having the sole authority to adjudicate
such constitutional matters.
This sent the clear message
that TPLF’s leaders would only accept negotiations on their terms and felt
entitled to disregard the constitutional order at their whim.
War erupted
And then came 4 November
2020, the fateful day the war erupted following Tigrayan forces attacking the
Ethiopian National Defence Forces’ (ENDF) Northern Command.
According to the TPLF, the
attack was a ‘pre-emptive’ strike. But, once again, this is another testament
to the elites’ exceptionalist attitude.
Regardless of growing
disputes, how could a regional force legitimately engage in a pre-emptive
strike against a national army base? Also, how would the TPLF-dominated EPRDF
have handled an identical situation? Surely, TPLF would have engaged in a
brutal mission to restore the constitutional order. According to its elites,
however, Tigray can do this legitimately
This, of course, is not to
say that the war began on 4 November. Indeed, the sense of insecurity created
among Tigrayan elites due to growing irredentism in Amhara, the purported threat
posed by Isaias Afwerki, and other perceived provocations by the federal
government have all significantly contributed to the escalation.
After the war broke out,
Tigrayan exceptionalism took on a somewhat different form, but still had its
core building blocks such as indomitability, omnipotence, and intransigence
intact. In addition, the international media’s frequent reference of Tigrayan
forces as ‘battle-hardened’ was taken as a global recognition of the
exceptionalism.
Initially, TPLF’s military adventure did not go as planned. The federal government, assisted by Eritrean soldiers, Amhara forces, and military drones, managed to dislodge the Tigrayan regional administration in a matter of three weeks. This sent the first shock to the self-assurance of Tigrayan elites, creating temporary self-doubt and fueling a desire for vengeance. It also led the TPLF to go underground, regroup clandestinely, and, following months of preparation, wage a successful counterattack in June 2021.
Following the declaration
of a unilateral ceasefire by the federal government and the ENDF’s withdrawal
from Tigray, TPLF marched onto Afar and Amhara regions and unleashed vengeful
military operations. The operations led to the death of many innocent civilians
and widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure.
TPLF’s subsequent ability
to cause disturbance in neighboring regions and advance on town after town
towards Addis Abeba was again seen as a demonstration of Tigray’s army
exceptionalism as being capable of defeating a national army and toppling a
central government. To a large extent, the international community also bought
into this narrative.
Vulnerability and
invincibility
All this ended abruptly
when the federal government relaunched successful offensives, which forced
Tigray forces to retreat to their home region in late December 2021. However,
this military setback has not changed TPLF’s narratives of exceptionalism and
bravado.
TPLF now portrays Tigray as
being invincible, but also vulnerable.On the one hand, the horrendous suffering
of ordinary Tigrayans is used to show to the world Tigray’s vulnerability—a
small minority under a “genocidal” attack by an evil majority. On the other
hand, the partially successful military operation and the army’s strength are
presented as proof of Tigray’s indomitability.
Tigray’s elites also continue to play with the idea of Tigray’s independence. At the same time, they request that the federal budget be released and disputed lands—which were seized by force at the war’s outset and are now administered by Amhara’s government—be returned to Tigray. These, of course, may be considered sensible constitutional demands. However, if Tigrayan elites are to rely on the constitution when it comes to solving the land dispute with Amhara or the release of the federal budget, they also need to show a willingness to accept the constitutional order.
The constitution recognizes only one defense force—ENDF—and not a regional defense force such as the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF); the constitution allows secession only in accordance with legally prescribed procedures under Article 39, and not through the de facto statehood entertained by Tigrayan elites.
Furthermore, they must
accept the legitimacy of the federal government and its institutions such as
the houses of parliament and the National Election Board. Accordingly, if the
need emerges, they should be willing to conduct federally mandated regional
elections or a referendum that is overseen by the Board.
However, at least up until
now, there is no desire to respect the constitutional order, and the thinking
amongst the elite is that Tigray is not bound by the constitution.
In short, the current state
of Tigrayan exceptionalism could be summed up as a blend of fear and courage,
vulnerability and invincibility, omniscience and willful ignorance, and the
desire to be free and in control.
The exceptionalism does not
know any sort of compromise—something inherent in the general political culture
of Ethiopia but particularly so among the Tigrayan elite. Persistence and
stubbornness are viewed as coveted virtues, regardless of the net outcome.
As a result, no matter how
many people die and how huge the destruction, all is justified as martyrdom and
sacrifice, and such sacrifice is encouraged irrespective of the devastating
consequences it has on the long-term interest of Tigray.
Ethiopia needs healing and
this can be achieved only through dialogue and compromise. But, this requires
humility from all sides.
Tigrayan elites ought to
therefore change their priorities for the sake of innocent Tigrayans currently
going through unimaginable suffering. They should conduct honest introspection,
put aside exceptionalism, and demonstrate that Tigray is indeed the home of
Ethiopia’s civilization and ancient wisdom by coming up with dynamic plans to
facilitate a peace process.
At the end of the day,
Tigray’s salvation depends more on its elites’ ability to make peace with their
neighbors than waging and winning war over them. Peace, of course, entails a
painful compromise; but, whether one wins or loses, the cost of war is much
higher than that of peace.
Credit Ethiopia Insight
Ethiopian Semay
